Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games
نویسندگان
چکیده
A family of core extensions for cooperative TU-games is introduced. These solution concepts are non-empty when applied to non-balanced games yet coincide with the core whenever the core is non-empty. The extensions suggest how an exogenous regulator can sustain a stable and efficient outcome, financing a subsidy via individual taxes. Economic and geometric properties of the solution concepts are studied. When taxes are proportional, the proportional prenucleolus is proposed as a single-valued selection device. An application of these concepts to the decentralization of a public goods economy is discussed. JEL Classification C71, H21, H41
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 38 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009