Balancedness of permutation games and envy-free allocations in indivisible good economies
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a simple proof of the balancedness of permutation games. In the proof we use the existence of envy-free allocations in economies with indivisible objects, quasi-linear utility functions, and an amount of money. 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
منابع مشابه
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