Participatory Liability for Breach of Trust or Fiduciary Duty
نویسندگان
چکیده
Confusion surrounds the equitable liability of a third party to a trust or fiduciary relationship who participates in a breach of the trust or fiduciary duty, but without necessarily receiving trust property.1 Compounding this confusion is the absence of consensus in courts that share a common Chancery law heritage. Notably, the English courts, including the Privy Council within that term, and the High Court of Australia take quite different approaches to the liability, although drawing upon the same nineteenth century trust law precedents. The Canadian common law is different again, although reliant upon the same cases.2 Until recently, the jurisdictional differences were excused on the basis that the Australian and Canadian courts had not yet had the opportunity to consider the Privy Council’s rationalisation of this form of equitable participatory liability in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan (Royal Brunei) in 1995.3 This still may be so with respect to the Canadian law, which will not be considered further in this chapter, but it seems clear now that the Australian law is set on a different path.4 The English approach is one of broad principle. In Royal Brunei, Lord Nicholls gathered together the nineteenth century trust law precedents and reformulated them as a loss based ‘accessory’ liability that attaches to a third party, D, who procures or assists in any breach of trust by the fiduciary, F.5 From the twentieth century trust law precedents he identified a requirement of ‘dishonesty’ on the
منابع مشابه
Holding the Government to Account: the ‘stolen Wages’ Issue, Fiduciary Duty and Trust Law
[This article examines whether trust or fiduciary law provides potential ‘stolen wages’ plaintiffs with a strong basis for a claim over money in bank accounts that previous governments held on the plaintiffs’ behalf. It also considers the broader issue of whether governments owed a fiduciary duty flowing from their obligations under general ‘protective’ legislation to prevent such workers from ...
متن کاملA Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of Care
ion, the difference between the two perspectives can seem to fade into insignificance. On the one hand, fiduciary law is perfectly capable of accommodating nonmandatory obligations. Fiduciary law scholars readily acknowledge that, under certain circumstances, shareholders should be permitted to waive at least some fiduciary duties. 141 Generally, they simply want to put in place sufficient safe...
متن کاملBasis of Physician’s Civil Liability in Necessary and Unnecessary Treatments in Iranian and American Law
Medical treatments are divided to essential and unnecessary treatments. Treatments and cosmetic surgery in the category of unnecessary treatments and reconstructive surgery and other treatments for example heart, liver and kidney transplant surgery placed in the category of essential treatments. Compensation basis in essential treatments in Iranian law, among basics of the negligence, strict li...
متن کاملStructural Impediments to Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims
Stephen D. Rosenberg, Esq. is a partner in the McCormack Firm, a Boston litigation firm, where he heads the firm’s ERISA Practice Group. He has extensive experience in ERISA litigation, including breach of fiduciary duty cases and class actions, as well as in commercial litigation and arbitration, insurance coverage and bad faith, and intellectual property disputes. He publishes a blog at www.b...
متن کاملDividing loyalties: caring for individuals and populations.
Are health maintenance organization (HMO) physicians obligated to act exclusively in the interest of the individual patient? Does the mere existence of financial incentives to limit patient care violate this obligation? To what extent are doctors responsible for the population of patients served by a health plan, or for promoting a fair distribution of health care among society as a whole? Thes...
متن کامل