Large Supports are Required for Well-Supported Nash Equilibria

نویسندگان

  • Yogesh Anbalagan
  • Hao Huang
  • Shachar Lovett
  • Sergey Norin
  • Adrian Vetta
  • Hehui Wu
چکیده

We prove that for any constant k and any < 1, there exist bimatrix win-lose games for which every -WSNE requires supports of cardinality greater than k. To do this, we provide a graphtheoretic characterization of win-lose games that possess -WSNE with constant cardinality supports. We then apply a result in additive number theory of Haight [8] to construct win-lose games that do not satisfy the requirements of the characterization. These constructions disprove graph theoretic conjectures of Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou [7] and Myers [13].

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تاریخ انتشار 2015