Michael Stolpe (Kiel Institute of the World Economy)

This paper analyses the efficiency of venture capital and its impact on primary equity markets in France and Germany. It shows that venture capital operates according to the signalling model in France and according to the learning model in Germany. Only the learning model can serve as a rationale for government subsidies. In the signalling model, many young venture capital firms succeed without a protected learning period because they already excel in the screening, monitoring and management supporting services they provide. They will seek to signal their quality to outsiders by taking portfolio firms public early. A variety of empirical tests and policy implications are discussed. This paper is part of the project European Integration, Financial Systems and Corporate Performance (EIFC) carried out within the European Commission’s specific programme “Improving the Human Research Potential and the SocioEconomic Knowledge Base”. Financial support from the European Union, DG Research (Contract No. HPSE—CT—1999—00039), is gratefully acknowledged. The project homepage is maintained by Dr. Anthony Bartzokas at www.intech.unu.edu/whoswho/index.htm.