Thirty Years of Solicitude: Antitrust Law and Physician Cartels
نویسندگان
چکیده
For over thirty years the United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (“Agencies”) have confronted bands of businessmen who have steadfastly refused to pay attention to legal precedent, repeated governmental pronouncements, and administrative sanctions imposed on their colleagues. The conduct revealed in these cases evidences a willingness to blatantly disregard the law by repeatedly undertaking arrangements already deemed illegal by the enforcers or by concocting schemes that raise untested but dubious justifications. Who are these lawbreakers? Organized criminals? Internet spam artists? Boiler-room operators? No, these cases involve physicians, some grouped in associations numbering in the thousands and almost always proceeding with the advice of business consultants and counsel.1 The conduct challenged by the government involves the formation of loosely-structured organizations, ranging from Independent Practice Associations to Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO) to other kinds of loose “networks” that collectively bargain with employers or managed care organizations for provider contracts.2
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