The Undesirability of Randomized Income Taxation under Decreasing Risk Aversion
نویسندگان
چکیده
For the standard specification of the utilitarian optimal income tax problem with hidden characteristics, the paper shows that randomized tax schemes are undesirable if preferences exhibit a property of weakly decreasing risk aversion according to the multidimensional risk aversion concept of Hellwig (2004). The property of decreasing risk aversion also implies uniqueness of the optimal income tax schedule and continuity in cases where the type distribution has a continuous density.
منابع مشابه
Optimal Taxation under Income Uncertainty
Optimal taxation under income uncertainty has been extensively developed in expected utility theory, but it is still open for inseparable utility function between income and effort. As an alternative of decision-making under uncertainty, prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1992)) has been obtained empirical support, for example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and C...
متن کاملA Note on Deaton's Theorem on the Undesirability of Non- uniform Excise Taxation
The paper provides an extension and a new proof of Deatons theorem on the undesirability of nonuniform excise taxation when income taxes are a¢ ne and preferences over consumption goods are separable from labour-leisure choices, homothetic, and identical across agents. Key Words: Optimal Excise Taxes, Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem, Deatons Theorem JEL Classi cation: H21
متن کاملUnderstanding the Evolution of Inequality during Transition: the Optimal Income Taxation Framework
What explains the spectacular increases in inequality of disposable income in transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe? There are at least two possible explanations. First, the pre-tax distribution of income became more unequal because of the shift to a market economy. Second, the degree of progressivity of the income tax system declined. But each of these factors is in turn determi...
متن کاملPolicy-oriented parties and the choice between social and private insurance
We study the political economy of social insurance in a world where individuals di¤er in both income and risk. Social insurance is ...nanced through distortionary taxation and redistributes across income and risk. Individuals vote on social insurance which they can complement with insurance bought on the private market. Private insurance is actuarially fair but su¤ers from adverse selection whi...
متن کاملMobility, taxation and welfare
Income mobility is often thought to equalize permanent incomes and thereby to improve social welfare. The welfare analysis of mobility often fails, however, to account for the cost of the variability of periodic incomes around permanent incomes. This paper assesses the net welfare benefit of mobility by assuming both a social aversion to inequality in permanent incomes and an individual aversio...
متن کامل