Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods

Supplementary Note for “ Coalitionally Strategy - Proof Rules in Allotment Economies with Homogeneous Indivisible Goods ” Kentaro Hatsumi

In this supplementary note, we provide the proof of Fact 1 and detailed explanations for Example 4, 5, and 6. The only if part of Fact 1 is proved by Sasaki (1997) and the if part is by Kureishi (2000). However, both papers have not been published. Thus, we provide the proof for completeness. In the explanations for Examples 4, 5, and 6, we provide tables that make it easy to check especially c...

Coalitionally Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies of Homogeneous Indivisible Goods

We consider the allotment problem of homogeneous indivisible goods among agents with single-peaked and risk-averse von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functions. We establish that a rule satisfies coalitional strategy-proofness, same-sideness, and strong symmetry if and only if it is the uniform probabilistic rule. By constructing an example, we show that if same-sideness is replaced by re...

Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object

We study two allocation models. In the first model, we consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-dipped preferences. In the second model, a degenerate case of the first one, we study the allocation of an indivisible object to a group of agents. Our main result is the characterization of the class of Pareto optimal and coalitionally strategy-pr...

Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies

Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisibilities

This paper studies an exchange economy with a nite number of agents in which each agent is initially endowed with a nite number of (personalized) indivisible commodities. We observe that the equivalence theorem of the core and the competitive equilibrium may not hold for this economy when the coalitional form game is generated in the standard manner. We provide an alternative de nition of the c...