Contract Negotiation and the Coase Conjecture∗
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper analyzes an explicit protocol of contract negotiation between a principal who has all the bargaining power and an agent who holds some private information about his preferences. It extends the framework of the Coase conjecture to situations in which the seller and the buyer must determine the quantity or the quality of the good being sold. The results also provide a foundation for renegotiation-proof contracts. The equilibrium probability that efficient contracts are implemented goes to one as renegotiation frictions become negligible. The principal extracts a strictly positive surplus from the relationship, in contrast to the standard Coase conjecture with binary sales and posted prices.
منابع مشابه
Contract Negotiation and the Coase Conjecture: A Strategic Foundation for Renegotiation-Proof Contracts ∗
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