Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory CREST Working Paper Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium : New Results from Old Methods
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چکیده
This paper provides a proof of a condition for uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium. Existing proofs of the same condition have shown it to imply a unique element within a limited class of Cournot equilibria, but leave open the possibility of other purestrategy equilibria outside this class. A simpler approach permits us to derive the condition and to rule out the possibility of these other equilibria. The approach used also provides new insight into the conditions for existence of Cournot equili-
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Cournot-Nash equilibria in continuum games with non-ordered preferences
In the usual framework of continuum games with externalities, we substantially generalize Cournot–Nash existence results [Balder, A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria, Int. J.Game Theory 24 (1995) 79–94; On the existence of Cournot–Nash equilibria in continuum games, J.Math. Econ. 32 (1999) 207–223; A unifying pair of Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence results, J. Econ. Theory 10...
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For games with a measure space of players a tandem pair, consisting of a mixed and a pure Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence result, is presented. Their generality causes them to be completely mutually equivalent. This provides a unifying pair of Cournot–Nash existence results that goes considerably beyond the central result of E. J. Balder (1995, Int. J. Game Theory 24, 79–94, Theorem 2.1). Th...
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