Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
We characterize the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria in symmetric separating strategies in Milgrom and Webers (1982) model of English auctions. There is a continuum of such equilibria. The equilibrium derived by Milgrom and Weber is that in which bids are maximal. Only in the case of pure private values does a restriction to weakly undominated strategies select a unique equilibrium. This has important implications for empirical studies of English auctions, particularly outside the pure private values paradigm. JEL Class: D44, D82
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 38 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2002