Moral Unreason: The Case of Psychopathy

Psychopaths are renowned for their immoral behavior. They are ideal candidates for testing the empirical plausibility of moral theories. Many think the source of their immorality is their emotional deficits. Psychopaths experience no guilt or remorse, feel no empathy, and appear to be perfectly rational. If this is true, sentimentalism is supported over rationalism. Here, I examine the nature of psychopathic practical reason and argue that it is impaired. The relevance to morality is discussed. I conclude that rationalists can explain the moral deficits of psychopaths as well as sentimentalists. In the process, I identify psychological structures that underpin practical rationality. Psychopathic individuals are perhaps best known for their flagrant disregard for social and moral norms. A number of psychopathologies are connected with violent and amoral behavior—such as schizophrenia and multiple personality disorder—but the profile of the psychopath is unique. Psychopaths are not subject to the profound disturbances of thoughts characteristic of these other conditions, but appear lucid and rational, yet peculiarly incapable of sustaining adult socialized behavior. They have dysfunctional personal relationships, characterized by violence, exploitation, and philandering. Most never gain any education to speak of or have successful careers due to an inability to put up with routine work and sustained mental effort. It is common for them to have criminal records of one form or another, often starting in early adolescence. Emotionally, they are significantly impaired, incapable of feeling guilt or empathy, their fear and pain responses are abnormal, and their other emotions are shallow compared to the normal population. They are manipulative, egocentric, and impulsive (Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 1993). Given their peculiar profile, psychopaths are of particular interest to moral philosophy. At first blush, it appears that they refuse to adopt social and moral norms, not because they are mad, but because they are not swayed by the emotions that influence us. They are unhampered by guilt, remorse, or fear of retribution. Central to this emotional landscape is a complete lack of empathy. This provides substantial support for sentimentalism as an empirical theory, particularly of the Humean sort. For Hume, the judgment that something is morally right or wrong is Many thanks to John Kulvicki, Shaun Nichols, Steven Davis, and an anonymous reviewer for invaluable criticisms and suggestions. I have also benefited from conversations with Adelle Forth and comments from audiences at Carleton University and University of Dayton. Address for correspondence: Department of Philosophy, Paterson Hall, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6, Canada. Email: [email protected] Mind & Language, Vol. 20 No. 2 April 2005, pp. 237–257. #BlackwellPublishingLtd. 2005, 9600GarsingtonRoad,Oxford,OX42DQ,UKand350MainStreet,Malden,MA02148,USA. nothing but the feeling of approbation or disapprobation of that something. What makes an agent virtuous is her propensity to feel certain emotions and not others under specific circumstances. All moral emotions ultimately derive from our ability and inclination to share the feelings of those around us. Hume calls this vicarious emotional sharing ‘sympathy’ which corresponds to ‘empathy’ as it is currently used (Hume, 1777/1975; Mackie, 1980). Without empathy or normal emotions, then, the moral emotions can’t develop, and the individual will be immoral or amoral, if you like. Psychopaths fit this profile exactly. The question remains whether psychopathy provides support of sentimentalism as an empirical theory over competing ethical theories. For instance, does psychopathy support sentimentalism over rationalism—the idea that morality is a form of practical rationality? On the face of it, it would seem so. Compared to other populations with behavioral and emotional problems, psychopaths appear remarkably rational. On this basis, Shaun Nichols (2002a) argues that psychopathy presents a case in favor of sentimentalism and against rationalism. The idea is as follows. Any direct attempts to argue that it is irrational to be immoral or that it is not irrational to be immoral have been inconclusive insofar as opinions remain strongly divided. But one might go about things in a more indirect way. Since neither position is impressed by the other’s insistence that immoral acts are expressions of lacking emotions or deficient practical reason, we may be able to advance the debate by moving outside the moral realm to where opinions tend to concur. Most rationalists and sentimentalists agree that a person incapable of feeling regret lacks moral emotions and that someone incapable of forming a coherent plan of action is lacking in practical reason. If emotion is centrally involved in morality, we should expect amorality to correlate significantly with disturbed emotions. Similarly, if rationalism is true, we should expect immorality to be connected with a high degree of practical irrationality. Since it is clear that psychopaths have emotional deficits of the sort relevant to sentimentalist view of morality, the question I will be concerned with is whether they also have deficits in their practical reason. If we find, as Nichols claims, that psychopaths have intact reason, sentimentalism gains strong support over rationalism. I will argue that although psychopathy supports sentimentalism it does not speak against rationalism. Psychopaths have deficits in their practical reason that are rarely 1 In his own account of morality, Nichols (2002b) includes both an affective and a normative theory element. On this view, psychopathic amorality consists in lacking the affective element. 2 In what follows, what I say about sentimentalism cannot always be said about Hume. Hume thought that passions were original existences that didn’t represent anything, and that only false beliefs could lead to irrational passion or willing/intending. I assume that most modern sentimentalists or Humeans deny both. Such denial is quite compatible with a Humean theory of motivation (Smith, 1994) and sentimentalist moral theory (Mackie, 1977; Blackburn, 1998). Means-end reasoning can be substantial whilst still purely instrumental. Cf. also Korsgaard’s (1996) powerful argument that even Humeans ought to accept some genuine cases of irrationality. 238 H. Maibom # Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005 large enough for us to regard them as mad, but that nevertheless significantly impair their decision-making abilities. For instance, they have a narrowed attention span, limiting how many things they can pay attention to at the same time and how long they can sustain attention. In consequence, they experience a number of difficulties in reasoning that directly impacts their moral competence: difficulty coherently universalizing maxims, understanding their duty, and applying any moral understanding they might have. If I’m right, psychopathy does not present a case against rationalism. However, much of the interest of the paper lies in why psychopathy does not present such a case. I connect psychological mechanisms and processes with practical rationality with the aim of showing how the former underpin the latter. I hope it will also provide more flesh to the idea of immorality as rational deficit. The paper is organized as follows. First, I introduce constraints on practical reason that are relatively uncontroversial and bear a close relation to moral judgment. For this I lean on Onora O’Neill’s (1998) interpretation of Kant’s ethical project. Second, I examine the cognitive shortcomings of psychopaths and link them to shortcomings in practical reason. I show that psychopaths are not irrational only when they are also immoral. They have more general rational deficits. Third, I show how the deficits found in psychopaths’ practical reason impact their moral capacities. In section 4 and 5, I address objections to my position. I argue against the suggestion that humans with undeveloped reason nevertheless are morally competent, that psychopaths’ deficits can’t be rational because they are untreatable, and that that their practical reasoning deficits cannot be explained in terms of an underlying emotional deficit (cf. Damasio, 1994). Finally, I outline some psychological mechanisms that underpin practical rationality.