Self - Sabotage ∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We analyze the incentives of a vertically-integrated producer (VIP) to engage in “self-sabotage”. Self-sabotage occurs when a VIP intentionally increases its upstream costs and/or reduces the quality of its upstream product. We identify conditions under which self-sabotage is profitable for the VIP even though it raises symmetrically the cost of the upstream product to all downstream producers and/or reduces symmetrically the quality of all downstream products. Under specified conditions, self-sabotage can enable a VIP to disadvantage downstream rivals differentially without violating parity requirements.
منابع مشابه
Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
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متن کاملwww.econstor.eu Sabotage in tournaments: Evidence from a natural experiment
Many tournaments are plagued by sabotage among competitors. Typically, sabotage is welfare-reducing, but from an individual’s perspective an attractive alternative to exerting positive effort. Yet, given its illegal and often immoral nature, sabotage is typically hidden, making it difficult to assess its extent and its victims. Therefore, we use data from Judo World Championships, where a rule ...
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