Cores of non-atomic market games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley [2], and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [12]. We show that the core of such games is norm compact and we provide some representation results. We also give a Multiple Priors interpretation of some of our results.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 34 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006