Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply
نویسندگان
چکیده
Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale (1998) [CG, hereafter] studied the impact of imposing a cap on lobbying expenditures. They showed that a cap may lead to (1) greater expected aggregate expenditure and (2) a less efficient allocation of a political prize. In their comment, Todd Kaplan and David Wettstein (2005) [KW, hereafter] show that if the cap is not rigid (i.e., its effect on the cost of lobbying is continuous) it has no effect.
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