Dynamic Contractual Enforcement : a Model of Strikes
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper provides a theory of strikes as part of a constrained efficient enforcement mechanism for an implicit contractual agreement. A firm possessing contemporaneously private information about demand engages in an enduring relationship with its workforce. If the information becomes perfectly observable subsequently, then, modulo discounting, the first-best is implementable, but strikes are always off the equilibrium path. If the observations of the workforce are imperfect strikes occur in equilibrium. The dynamic contracting problem is modeled as a repeated game with imperfect monitoring. The equilibrium exhibits production inefficiency and incomplete insurance to mitigate the inefficiencies caused by strikes.
منابع مشابه
Limited Enforcement and the Organization of Production, Erwan Quintin, FRB Dallas
This paper describes a dynamic, general equilibrium model designed to assess whether contractual imperfections in the form of limited enforcement can account for international differences in the organization of production. In the model, limited enforcement constrains agents to operate establishments below their optimal scale. As a result, economies where contracts are enforced more efficiently ...
متن کاملبررسی جامع اضافهولتاژهای صاعقه در مزارع بادی با پیکربندیهای متفاوت به همراه تاثیر سیستم زمین
This paper is treated with major risks applied by lightning strikes to wind farms. The risks illustrated in this research include overvoltage caused by direct and indirect effects of lightning strikes on any components of wind farm. As demands for electrical energy throughout our world is increased more and more nowadays, wind power plants are extended in every possible locations correspondingl...
متن کاملIndustrialization and the Evolution of Enforcement Institutions∗
We analyze the evolution of economic institutions during the process of industrialization. In particular, we focus on the institution of contract enforcement. Empirically, we show that, during the process of industrialization, countries tend to shift their manufacturing production towards industries that require more relationship-specific investment. Theoretically, we build a dynamic model with...
متن کاملOn the Specification and Enforcement of Privacy-Preserving Contractual Agreements
We are here concerned with the enforcement at runtime of contractual agreements (e.g., Terms of Service) that respect users’ privacy policies. We do not provide a technical solution to the problem but rather give an overview of a framework for such an enforcement, and briefly discuss related work and ideas on how to address part of the framework.
متن کاملContract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons
This paper examines a general model of contract in multi-period settings with both external and self-enforcement. In the model, players alternately engage in contract negotiation and take individual actions. A notion of contractual equilibrium, which combines a bargaining solution and individual incentive constraints, is proposed and analyzed. The modeling framework helps identify the relation ...
متن کامل