Against generality: meaning in genetics and philosophy.

Philosophers have always sought general theories.’ We have sought general theories of truth, knowledge, justice, and beauty, to mention just a few. In The Principles of Morals and Legislation, for example, Bentham says that ‘By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question’. He goes on to emphasize, ‘I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual but of every measure of government’.2 Likewise, Tarski’s theory of truth was intended to be general in virtue of its formality, and he makes it clear that he thinks it important that a semantic theory applies, directly or indirectly, to psychology, sociology, linguistics, physics and biology.3 For whatever reasons, in many different fields, it has seemed important to aim for general accounts. This predilection for general theories has played an important role in philosophy of science. Philosophers have sought general theories of confirmation, explanation, reduction, and rationality, and, of course, of theories themselves. It has seemed important, for example, to produce an account of explanation extending across the entire range of the sciences, and it was regarded as a serious challenge when some philosophers came to contend