In Defense of Epiphenomenalism
نویسنده
چکیده
Recent worries about possible epiphenomenalist consequences of nonreductive physicalism are misplaced, not, as many have argued, because nonreductive physicalism does not imply epiphenomenalism but because the epiphenomenalist implication is actually a virtue of the theory, rather than a vice. It is only by showing how certain kinds of mental properties are causally impotent that cognitive scientific explanations of mentality as we know them are possible.
منابع مشابه
An Argument against Epiphenomenalism
_________________________________________________ I formulate an argument against epiphenomenalism; the argument shows that epiphenomenalism is extremely improbable. Moreover the argument suggests that qualia not only have causal powers, but have their causal powers necessarily. I address possible objections and then conclude by considering some implications the argument has for dualism.
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