Political institutions and developmental governance in sub-Saharan Africa

This article addresses the question of whether, or under what conditions, democratic institutions contribute to ‘developmental governance’ in sub-Saharan Africa, in forms such as coherent policy formulation, effective public administration, and limited corruption. While few dispute the desirability for Africa of democracy and good governance in theory, many remain sceptical about whether the two necessarily go together in practice. Using a simple framework informed by the new institutional economics, I analyse the impact of political institutions on governance quality in a sample of 38 sub-Saharan African countries. The main finding is that a combination of democratic contestation and institutional restraints on governments’ discretionary authority substantially improves developmental governance. Judged against liberal democratic ideals, Africa’s emerging democracies have many shortcomings. Yet the article shows that democratic institutions systematically enhance African states’ performance as agents of development. I N T R O D U C T I O N Political institutions and governance are leading items on the African development agenda. Most observers recognise that any adequate account of the region’s poor performance must extend well beyond narrowly economic factors. Adverse world market conditions and internal structural rigidities on their own do not adequately explain Africa’s stagnation and decline. Meanwhile, the changes in relative prices central to the structural adjustment programmes controversially prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have, whatever their merits, proved insufficient to generate sustained growth and development (Collier & Gunning 1999; Lewis 1996; Ravenhill 1993). By the late 1980s, limitations * Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand. I am grateful to Francis Ikome, Michael O’Donovan, John Stremlau, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. This article builds on parts of a paper presented at a May 2003 conference held by the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa. Any errors are my responsibility. J. of Modern African Studies, 42, 2 (2004), pp. 163–187. f 2004 Cambridge University Press DOI: 10.1017/S0022278X04000084 Printed in the United Kingdom of African states – reflected in weak policy formulation, ineffective public administration, and corruption – featured prominently in official diagnoses from both sides of the structural adjustment debate (UNECA 1989; World Bank 1989). Consensus emerged that dysfunctional political institutions and governance bear much of the blame for the region’s disappointing economic performance, hindering the successful pursuit of any development strategy – whether oriented towards capitalism or socialism, self-reliance or global integration (Mkandawire & Soludo 1999; Ndulu & O’Connell 1999; Sandbrook 1986; van de Walle 2001). Changes internationally and in the region during the early 1990s broadened governance-related concerns beyond merely strengthening states’ technical and administrative capacity to include promoting democracy. The Soviet Union’s collapse removed the superpower rivalry that had previously discouraged Western governments from linking bilateral aid to democracy (Whitehead 2003). African governments eager to attract financial assistance therefore faced tangible pressures to move towards more open and competitive political regimes (Clapham 1996: 187–207; Harbeson 2000). Meanwhile, rising internal opposition mobilised behind the banner of ‘civil society ’ in seeking to dislodge authoritarian governments (Anyang’ Nyong’o 1987; Harbeson et al. 1994; Lewis 1992). The resulting wave of democratisation reinforced broader approaches to governance, moving from a narrow focus on public-service reform to include the more ambitious goals of fostering political responsiveness and accountability (Diamond 2001; Healey & Robinson 1992; Hyden 1992). This conception continues to exert profound influence on the regional development agenda. It features prominently in a recent collaborative report by the World Bank and several African research bodies (World Bank 2001). Similarly, the African Union’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) endorses democracy and good governance as essential ‘conditions for sustainable development ’ (African Union 2001 ; Hope 2002). Yet while few dispute the desirability for Africa of democracy and good governance in theory, many remain sceptical about whether the two necessarily go together in practice. In an early broadside on the ‘democracy and governance’ synthesis, Richard Jeffries (1993) argued that indiscriminate promotion of multiparty democracy threatened to undermine some of Africa’s most promising experiments in effective governance, citing the non-democratic governments of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana (before the 1992 presidential election) and Yoweri Museveni in Uganda as illustrations. More generally, sceptics have questioned whether democracy is likely to alter the neopatrimonial governance widely blamed for African 164 ROD A L ENC E