On Benchmarks: Institutions and Violence in Iraq

Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States has sought to encourage institutional developments in Iraq that would contribute to national reconciliation and mitigate sectarian and insurgent violence. In these reform efforts, including recent “benchmarks,” the Bush administration has drawn on power-sharing and federalist models. The purpose of these efforts is to overcome the political dilemmas associated with the relative shift in power among the Sunni, Shia and Kurdish communities, and to blunt the majoritarian features of the political system in particular. A review of the theoretical and empirical literature suggests that the record of these institutional reforms in mitigating violence and ending civil wars is not encouraging. A detailed history of institutional reform efforts in Iraq shows that proposed institutional reforms have not constituted an endogenous political equilibrium, have not been credible, or have had perverse consequences. These findings suggest the limits on institutional reform and the importance of alternative means of restraining violence. Comments welcome to [email protected] and [email protected].