Strict equilibria interchangeability in multi-player zero-sum games
نویسندگان
چکیده
The interchangeability property of Nash equilibria in two-player zerosum games is well-known. This paper studies possible generalizations of this property to multi-party zero-sum games. A form of interchangeability property for strict Nash equilibria in such games is established. It is also shown, by proving a completeness theorem, that strict Nash equilibria do not satisfy any other non-trivial properties.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Log. Comput.
دوره 24 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014