Safeguarding the Military Naval Nuclear Fuel Cycle

In the safeguards agreements between non-nuclear-weaponstate members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency, there is a possibility for non-nuclear weapon states, acting with the approval of the agency’s board of governors, to remove from safeguards nuclear materials to be used in non-proscribed military activities such as naval nuclear propulsion. This possibility limits the power of the agency to enforce the primary goal of the safeguards agreement, i.e., to verify that nuclear materials are not diverted to pursue the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Brazil will soon be the first non-nuclear weapons state to deploy a nuclear submarine and the first to challenge the nonproliferation regime to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material from a military activity. As part of a strategy to address this important issue, and after reviewing the existing legal framework, this paper presents a model for the application of safeguards on the naval nuclear fuel cycle in a military environment. The model could potentially be used for Brazil’s naval fuel cycle but also be universally applicable to other non-nuclear weapon states and potentially to nuclear weapon states. A Discontinuity in the Safeguards Regime? The consequences for the nuclear nonproliferation regime of the spread of military nuclear-propelled vessels, including nuclear submarines, to non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) have been a recurring concern for more than twenty-five years.1 The current concerns focus on Brazil’s nuclear submarine program and Iran’s declared interest in naval nuclear programs.2 Germany and Japan, both NNWS, developed nuclear naval propulsion in the 1960s and 1970s but for civilian applications.3 At the heart of this apprehension is the interpretation of Paragraph 14 in the standard safeguards agreements between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and NNWS parties to the treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Paragraph 14 is the legal framework for the non-application of safeguards to nuclear material to be used in non-proscribed military activities such as nuclear propulsion: “NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE USED IN NON-PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES 14. The Agreement should provide that if the State intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded thereunder in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under the Agreement, the following procedures will apply: (a) The State shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear: (i) That the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking the State may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the nuclear material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and (ii) That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (b) The Agency and the State shall make an arrangement so that, only while the nuclear material is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in the Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be applied.