Recurrent Issues in the Study of Behavior Development: Metamodels

Metamodels, play an important role in shaping theory and research in behavioral development Recently, there has been increasing interest among theorists to explore metamodels of human development. In particular, developmentalists are searching for metamodels about human behavior that can both integrate existing data and generate new information. Such models would help researchers deal with the multidirectionality of behavior development and explain intraindividual variability and interindividual differences. Among today's commonmetamodels, contextualism is evolving as an alternative to the organismic and mechanistic world views of human development. Of course'.rnetamodels are metaphors, not truths. ,Known also as world views, metamodels are ~;..~E:);.philo~9phi~Lass.urnptions.ofparticular theorists "'about how the world functions (e. 'g:; Pepper, 1942). The utility. of ,a world, view depends upon the theorist's ability to frame and explain his or her theory. Moreover, the particular world view selected will influence not only the topics to be investigated, but also the methods used and the conclusions reached The 'behavior-analytical theory is often associated (perhaps incorrectly) with the mechanistic world view--with mechanical modes of explanation. As described Qy Overton and Reese (1973'1 Reese & Overton, 1970), a mechanistic metamode of development assumes that organisms are passive (reactive) and not active. The types of causality involved in a mechanistic model are material (e.g., physiological) and efficient (i.e., external forces). In addition, a mechanistic model is said to adhere to elementarism. That is, behavioral changes are reducible to their prior immutable forms. Under a mechanistic metamodel, the scientist's task is to analyze behavior in terms of its antecedent-consequent (cause-and-effect) relations and the temporal ordering of both the dependent and the independent variables. However, stUdying only simple cause-and-effect relationships between dependent and independent variables is insufficient for understanding behavior. To understand behavior we also must study the organization of codefined and interrelated stimulus and response classes in context (Skinner, 1931, 1935; Morris, 1992). Stimulus and response functions stand in direct interrelationship with one another. In behavior analysis, individuals are active agents contributing to their own development. Skinner did not regard animals or humans as "machines." Instead, he saw operant behavior as the "field of purpose and intention" (Day, 1992; see Skinner, 1974( p. 55). As opposed to the mechanistic View, the organismic metamodel of development stresses movement toward a final end-state while emphasiZing maturational and predetermined developmental stages. Hence, a person's characteristics (traits) and genetic/maturational proce~ses account for interiRdividual differences in behaVioral patterni. ;, In organismic theories, lear~ing experiences m~y accelerate or delay behaVioral dev.elopment, Qut do not change its course. '" A major limitation of the organismic model is that the contextual variables of experience (Le., 'history of conditioning) and environment (e.g., constraints and facilitators) play only secondary roles in behavioral development Even so, Overton's and Reese's interpretations of world views seem to have favored organismic approaches such as Piaget's (1960) cognitive-developmental theory and Erikson's (1950) psycho-social theory over approaches classified as mechanistic (e,g., Bijou & Baer, 1961). Recent psychological literature, however, suggests that ,both the mechanistic and. org~nismic models are···· inadequate to explain human development (Ford & Lerner, 1992; Hayes, Hayes & Reese 1988; Sameroff, 1983; Sarbin, 1977). Furthermore, some behavior analysts argue that mechanistic theory is an impediment to psychology's advance into the third stage of scientific evolution (see Morris, 1992). Morris proposes contextualism as the world view of behavior analysis (Morris, 1988, 1992). However, other,behavior analysts argue that immense behaviora1 complexity may be encompassed within a mechanistic metamodel. For instance, Man· (1992) stresses that a mechanistic metam6del is potentially capable of capturing many of the mysteries of behavioral dynamics. He suggests that there is no need to abando"! a mechanistic perspective to embrace contextuahsm when the former appears to imply the latter. Despite these opinions, the growing interest in contextualism as a metatheoretical framework is lessening the reliance upon both mechanistic and organismic world views. There are various reasons that may explain why many developmental theorists, including behavior analysts, have embraced contextualism as a metamodel for the study of human behavior. Unlike the organismic metamodel, behavior changes within contextuali~m are .not tel~oloQical, goal-directed or channeled Into partiCUlar directions. These cha~ges are not elementaristic or reductionistic. Theories based upon contextualism adhere to a holistic view, in which neither responses nor stimuli have any psychological meaning by themselves. Instead, their meaning lies in the interdependent relationship between stimulus ~nd response functions in context. Hence, the meaning of behavior emerges from its context (Morris, 1988). The behavior analysis of development has emphasized the study of sequential, .dynamic,. and reciprocal interactions between behaVing organisms and environmental conditions (Bijou, 1979). A behaving organism does not merely "interact" with the environment in a unidirectional, linear, and passive manner. Instead, the behavior and