Iii. Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil

Hospital Employees’ Knowledge of Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil

Background and Objectives: Enjoining good and forbidding (EGFE) evil are two fundamental topics in Islam. Many verses and narratives underscore the social, religious and political duties implied by enjoining good and forbidding evil. After all, these two divine treasures have been neglected because of indulgence and forgetfulness. The prime reason for this negligence seems to be the obliviousne...

Impact of Technology on Education in Islamic Countries in Middle East in the Political Communication Era

Technology is inherently neutral and can be used in equal measure for good or evil. Interestingly, this determination is a matter of perspective. Technology enables or enhances a number of activities. Fundamentally, technology can be used to improve teaching and learning, to make administrative operations more efficient and effective, to help discover knowledge and to help improve access to inf...

Plantinga and the Logical Problem of Evil

Problem of Evil in Taoism

This paper attempts to present the Taoist understanding of evil. In the Taoist tradition, especially in Tao Te Ching, evil is divided into two categories: causal evil and consequential evil. Causal evils are those evils that are said to be the causes of other evils; consequential evils are those that are said to be the consequences of the causal evils. Causal evils originate from human will, an...

Hospital Employees’ Knowledge of Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil

Background and Objectives: Enjoining good and forbidding (EGFE) evil are two fundamental topics in Islam. Many verses and narratives underscore the social, religious and political duties implied by enjoining good and forbidding evil. After all, these two divine treasures have been neglected because of indulgence and forgetfulness. The prime reason for this negligence seems to be the obliviousne...

Animal Suffering: A Moorean Response to a Problem of Evil

In this paper, I propose a new response to a particular instance of the problem of evil: the problem of animal suffering. My solution, in brief, is that the rational theist may argue, justifiably, that an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God would not allow gratuitous animal suffering to occur, and, therefore, all instances of animal suffering that are encountered are not instanc...