What Drives People's Choices in Turn-Taking Games, if not Game-Theoretic Rationality?
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چکیده
Citation for published version (APA): Ghosh, S., Heifetz, A., Verbrugge, R., & Weerd, H. D. (2017). What Drives People's Choices in TurnTaking Games, if not Game-Theoretic Rationality? In J. Lang (Ed.), Proceedings 6th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2017), Liverpool, U.K.: Proceedings (pp. 265284). (Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science (EPTCS); Vol. 251). Open Publishing Association. DOI: 10.4204/EPTCS.251.19
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تاریخ انتشار 2017