On the Robustness of Informative Cheap Talk∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford-Sobel (CS) model of strategic information transmission. This note identifies a simple condition on equilibrium payoffs, called NITS, that selects among CS equilibria. Under a commonly used regularity condition, only the equilibrium with the maximal number of induced actions satisfies NITS. We discuss various justifications for NITS, including recent work on perturbed cheap-talk games. We also apply NITS to two other models of cheap-talk, illustrating its potential beyond the CS framework. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D81.
منابع مشابه
Information Transmission with Cheap and Almost-Cheap Talk∗
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