Primacy of Action in Early Ontogeny

Much of the recent research on infant cognition is framed around a critique of Piaget's theory regarding The Origins of Intelligence (1936/1952) and The Construction of Reality in the Child (1937/1954). The article of Müller and Overton provides a humbling reexamination of this critique, bringing back to us how much has been thought and is accounted for in the monumental work Piaget left behind. But who can afford a thorough reading of Piaget in the current 'publish or perish' culture of academia? Müller and Overton seem to have managed, providing an eloquent demonstration that Piaget's action-centered view on cognitive development cannot be easily dismissed when considering it as a whole, not as a collection of discrete claims. More importantly, it challenges the current Zeitgeist that presumes prewiring, modularity, unsuspected cognitive processes and sophistication at the outset of development. Whether or not we agree with the long argument proposed by the authors, their discussion reminds us that developmental questions regarding transitions and the role of action in early ontogeny cannot be ignored. Many infancy researchers (including ourselves) have based a great deal of their work on disproving Piaget's claims regarding the developmental timing of certain com-petencies (e.g., the notion of a permanent object) and demonstrations of precocious spatial and physical knowledge that elude the fundamental questions of their developmental origin and the process underlying their rapid growth. In the frenzy of emerging new experimental techniques and paradigms for the study of infants, we have developed a formidable appetite for demonstrations of discrete sophistication in specific domains at the youngest age possible. But what are we left with and what kind of baby are we building in theory? Is it a mere collection of precocious abilities mysteriously accruing in development? We share the concerns of Müller and Overton that the recent neona-tivist stance inspiring much of the current theories and research in infancy might have thrown out the baby with the bath water. We will briefly suggest here that it is time to reconsider infants as developing actors in a meaningful environment, not as born philosophers contemplating a Cartesian world. If infants eventually develop as little philosophers , this development is grounded in their primary experience as actors in a resourceful environment.