Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem ¬リニ
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if the investors have heterogenous preferences implying heterogenous bargaining behavior, and if these preferences are private information. In the hold-up problem, incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of the investments to be shared by bargaining. Fair-minded individuals reject positive but unfair offers even if this causes a bargaining breakdown. As a bargaining opponent takes this into account, appearing to be fair-minded increases an investor’s bargaining power. If preferences are private information, investments signal preferences. The paper derives the conditions under which there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which all types of investor invest efficiently in order not to reveal information about his type unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining. JEL Classification: C70, D23, D63, D82, J33, K12, L22
منابع مشابه
Ferdinand von Siemens: Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem
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