EE 228 a - Lecture 21 - Spring 2006 Auctions and VCG Allocation

EE 228 a - Lecture - Spring 2006

We have, by now, seen the various uses of game theory in different aspects of networking like bandwidth trading, MAC Layer access, congestion control, etc. In this lecture, we will see how routing is modeled using game theory.

EE 228 a - Lecture 9 - Spring 2006 Complexity and Routing

Two fundamental problems scheduling and routing present themselves in the networking field. Although some ”easy” routing algorithms based upon single constraint optimization exist, we will see that routing with multiple constraints becomes computationally difficult. In order to quantify their intractability, a brief overview of complexity theory will first be presented and then applied to routi...

Simple Near - Optimal Auctions Lecture # 7 : Multi - Parameter Mechanism Design and the VCG Mechanism Lecture # 8 : Combinatorial and Wireless Spectrum Auctions

Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in heterogeneous-item auctions with unit demand

Many important problems in multiagent systems involve the allocation of multiple resources among the agents. For resource allocation problems, the well-known VCG mechanism satisfies a list of desired properties, including efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and the non-deficit property. However, VCG is generally not budget-balanced. Under VCG, agents pay the VCG payments, wh...

EE 228 a - Lecture 8 - Spring 2006

In this lecture, we investigate several scheduling policies for generalized communication networks. The goal is to maximize the network throughput under certain communication constraints. The network is modeled by a set of interconnected and interdependent queueing processes, and the constraints are specified in a service rate matrix. We show two scheduling policies that are optimal in some tec...