Cracking the Bennett-Riedel secure scheme and a critical analysis of their claims about the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise system

Recently, Bennett and Riedel (BR) (http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.7435v1) claimed that, in the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) classical statistical physical key exchange method, thermodynamics (statistical physics) is not essential and that the KLJN scheme provides no security. They attempt to prove the no-thermodynamics view by proposing a dissipation-free deterministic key exchange method with two batteries and two switches. After showing that the BR scheme is unphysical and that some elements of the assumptions violate basic protocols of secure communications, we crack their system by passive attacks in nine different ways, with 100% success, and show that the same cracking methods do not work against the KLJN scheme due to Johnson noise and the Second Law of Thermodynamics. We critically analyze the other claims of BR; among others, we prove that their equations (1-3) describing zero security are incorrect for the KLJN scheme. We give mathematical security proofs for each BR attack type and conclude that the information theoretic (unconditional) security of the KLJN method has not successfully been challenged.