Majority Rule and Utilitarian Welfare∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the welfare properties of majority and supermajority rules when voting is voluntary and costly. Voters in the model have private values with differing preference intensities and voting costs. Our model is non-parametric– with only weak assumptions on the distribution of the number of eligible voters, preferences and costs. We show that, in large elections, majority rule is utilitarian and that it is unique in this respect: Among all supermajority rules, only majority rule is utilitarian. JEL classification: D72
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