Iterated snowdrift game among mobile agents with myopic expected-reward based decision rule: Numerical and analytical research
نویسندگان
چکیده
Iterated spatial game among mobile population is an interesting problem in the fields of biological, social and economic sciences. Inspired by some recent works, this paper concentrates on iterated snowdrift game among movable and myopic agents. Two difference decision-making schemes, namely the utility-maximum rule and the Fermi rule, are applied and examined. In the former case, cooperation is found to be enhanced by moving velocity with an upperbound. The analytical results of the model are deduced at two extreme cases when agents cannot move or move quickly. In the latter case, the influence of velocity and temptation-to-defect are much more complicate. These results allow a deeper insight of related model as well as the emergence of cooperation.
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