Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
Incomplete information games, local interaction games and randommatching games are all special cases of a general class of interaction games (Morris (1997)). In this paper, we use this equivalence to present a uniÞed treatment of arguments generating uniqueness in games with strategic complementarities by introducing heterogeneity in these di¤erent settings. We also report on the relation between local and global heterogeneity, on the role of strategic multipliers and on puriÞcation in the three types of interaction game. ¤This paper was prepared for the Santa Fe Institute conference on The Economy as an Evolving, Complex System III, November 2001. This paper incorporates our earlier notes circulated under the title Big Noise, Little Noise. The authors are grateful for very valuable discussions with Sandeep Baliga, David Frankel, Atsushi Kajii, Ady Pauzner, Takashi Ui and Akos Valentinyi.
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