Codifiability, Relationship-Specific Information Technology Investment, and Optimal Contracting
نویسندگان
چکیده
His research interests focus on the intersection of supply chains and information systems, supplier management, market structures and relationships when electronic transactions are of concern, and on the role of knowledge in this context. ABSTRACT: The past few years have seen an explosion in the number of e-marketplaces , including a variety of electronic exchanges in the B2B arena, but many of these have also collapsed (e.g., Chemdex/Ventro). The question addressed in this paper is what are the underlying factors that affect which transactions are likely to be supportable by B2B exchanges. In particular, we identify and study three factors: supplier management, idiosyncratic investments in information systems, and codifiability (i.e., digitalizability) of product and order-fulfillment specifications underlying transactions. We show that transaction codifiability plays a fundamental role in influencing the nature of sustainable contracting and IT investments in e-markets. Hypotheses are derived from an analytical model of codifiability in e-marketplaces; 78 LEVI, KLEINDORFER, AND WU these hypotheses are supported by several case studies by the authors and others on the key success factors underlying B2B exchanges.
منابع مشابه
Codifiability, Relationship-Specific IT Investment, and Optimal Contracting
The last few years have seen on one hand an explosion in the number of e-marketplaces, including a variety of electronic exchanges in the B2B arena, and on the other hand the closing of or near collapse of several prominent exchanges (e.g., Chemdex/Ventro). The question addressed in this paper is what are the underlying factors that affect which transactions are likely to be supportable by eexc...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. of Management Information Systems
دوره 20 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003