Marcuse’s Phenomenology: Reading Chapter Six of One-Dimensional Man1

In a critique of my views on Marcuse’s relation to phenomenology, John Abromeit claims that Marcuse’s borrowings from Heidegger and Husserl are limited to the notion that modern science and technology are not neutral but are biased toward the domination of nature.2Abromeit thinks I exaggerate the importance of phenomenology for Marcuse in claiming more than this. Rather than replying to the details of his critique, I will present an analysis of the key text the interpretation of which is in dispute, the sixth chapter of One-Dimensional Man, in which Marcuse refers to both Husserl and Heidegger. A careful engagement with Marcuse’s argument there shows the importance of his borrowings from phenomenology. While not disagreeing with Abromeit’s claim that Marcuse’s most fundamental intellectual commitment is to Marxism, I show that he appropriates the phenomenological concept of experience, with significant implications for his political theory.