Agglomeration , tax competition , and fiscal equalization
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper analyzes the impact of fiscal equalization on asymmetric tax competition when positive agglomeration externalities are present. It shows that equalization of standardized tax revenue improves the spatial allocation of capital provided that agglomeration externalities are sufficiently strong. JEL Classification: R12, H71, H73.
منابع مشابه
Asymmetric tax competition and fiscal equalization in a repeated game setting
Article history: Received 29 July 2014 Received in revised form 3 October 2015 Accepted 5 October 2015 Available online 22 October 2015 This paper examines the relationship between tax competition and fiscal equalization in a standard tax competition model with repeated actions, in which regions differ in per capita capital endowments and production technologies. In particular, it asks how a fi...
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