Reputations in Repeated Games ∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information. ∗We have benefited from our collaboration and discussions with many coauthors and colleagues over the course of many years, and we are deeply grateful to them. We thank Martin Cripps, Olivier Gossner, Yuichi Yamamoto, and especially Ju Hu and Zehao Hu for helpful comments. We thank the National Science Foundation (SES-0961540 and SES1153893) for financial support. We thank the Stockholm, Toulouse, and UNSW Schools of Economics and the Universities of Cambridge, Chicago, and York for the opportunity to teach some of this material.
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