Public Responses to the Chernobyi Accident

The reactor accident at Chernobyl caught many European nations by surprise since most risk management institutions were unprepared for an accident of the magnitude and transnational character of Chernobyl. Although confusion and contradictory advice from these institutions dominated the risk management efforts in the early aftermath of the disaster, the dose savings achieved by protective actions were roughly proportional to the magnitude of the nuclear threat. The accident itself and the policies adopted to cope with the fallout had a major effect on public opinion. This effect was the more dramatic and enduring, the more a country was affected by the fallout and the higher the percentage of indifferent positions toward nuclear power was prior to the accident. The media certainly intensified public concern, but did not distort the seriousness of the risk or create confusion about what protection actions were adequate. The major lesson from the disaster is to have a better risk management and communication program in place before a disaster strikes. Public Responses to the Chernobyi Accident The reactor accident at Chernobyl in the Soviet Ukraine on April 25-26, 1986, posed a threat of radioactive contamination to various countries. The event provided a unique experience for studying attitude changes and public reactions to an identical stimulus in a multi-cultural context. Since the risk management institutions of most affected countries were unprepared for an accident of the magnitude and transnational character of Chernobyl, it was necessary to improvise appropriate responses to the fallout. A particular problem was the highly nonuniform distribution of ground deposition produced by rainout (Hohenemser et al., 1986). Both the disaster and the attempts to cope with the fallout situation had significant effects on public opinion and attitudes in the countries involved. Public responses were not only directed toward the origin of the disaster, the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, but included general considerations about the acceptability of nuclear power, the domestic nuclear power program, and the efficacy of risk management in each country. Although the official positions of each country's government toward nuclear energy were rarely reversed after the accident (Flavin, 1987), public opinion shifted towards a more skeptical overall position towards nuclear power, in almost all affected countries. Opposition parties in West Germany and the United Kingdom responded with a decision to phase out nuclear energy if they were given the opportunity to take over the