The possibility of a science of magic

The past few years have seen a resurgence of interest in the scientific study of magic. Despite being only a few years old, this “new wave” has already resulted in a host of interesting studies, often using methods that are both powerful and original. These developments have largely borne out our earlier hopes (Kuhn et al., 2008) that new opportunities were available for scientific studies based on the use of magic. And it would seem that much more can still be done along these lines. But in addition to this, we also suggested that it might be time to consider developing an outright science of magic—a distinct area of study concerned with the experience of wonder that results from encountering an apparently impossible event1. To this end, we proposed a framework as to how this might be achieved (Rensink and Kuhn, 2015). A science can be viewed as a systematic method of investigation involving three sets of issues: (i) the entities considered relevant, (ii) the kinds of questions that can be asked about them, and (iii) the kinds of answers that are legitimate (Kuhn, 1970). In the case of magic, we suggested that this could be done at three different levels, each focusing on a distinct set of issues concerned with the nature of magic itself: (i) the nature of magical experience, (ii) how individual magic tricks create this experience, and (iii) organizing knowledge of the set of known tricks in a more comprehensive way (Rensink and Kuhn, 2015). Our framework also included a base level focused on how the methods of magic could be used as tools to investigate issues in existing fields of study. Lamont (2010) and Lamont et al. (2010) raised a number of concerns about the possibility of such a science, which we have addressed (Rensink and Kuhn, 2015). More recently, Lamont (2015) raised a new objection, arguing that although base-level work (i.e., applications of magic methods) might be useful, there is too little structure in magic tricks for them to be studied in a systematic way at the other levels, ruling out a science of magic. We argue here, however, that although this concern raises some interesting challenges for this science, it does not negate the possibility that it could exist, and could contribute to the study of the mind. Many different kinds of magic tricks clearly exist, and Lamont (2015) provides some nice examples of these. But a science of magic centers primarily around experiential effects, not tricks (Rensink and Kuhn, 2015). The first level of our framework above the base, for instance, focuses on aspects of experience that are largely unique tomagic. One such set of issues concerns the possibility of different types—and levels—of wonder; an example is the work of Griffiths (2015) on the degree of interest evoked by various magical transformations. Issues also arise around people’s impression of a magical “stuff” which acts as a causal agent, and the extent to which our perceptions and beliefs can deviate from objective reality. In all of this, the details of how the experiences are evoked are irrelevant. Said another way: at this level, the scientific study of magic is not concerned with the nature of magic tricks themselves, but with themagical aspects of experience created by these tricks. And these aspects appear quite amenable to study. Magic tricks are of course important, and are the focus of the next level. Here, the emphasis is on how the effects evoked in each trick (including the sense of wonder) are created. A complete trick