An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
A paradox of self-reference in beliefs in games is identified, which yields a game-theoretic impossibility theorem akin to Russell’s Paradox. An informal version of the paradox is that the following configuration of beliefs is impossible: Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong This is formalized to show that any belief model of a certain kind must have a ‘hole.’ An interpretation of the result is that if the analyst’s tools are available to the players in a game, then there are statements that the players can think about but cannot assume. Connections are made to some questions in the foundations of game theory.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Studia Logica
دوره 84 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006