Pragmatic Encroachment and Theistic Knowledge
نویسنده
چکیده
Philosophical discussions of knowledge typically examine what makes a true belief knowledge. Traditionally those discussions involve the notions of reliability, safety, evidence, or justification (among others), notions labelled ‘epistemic’ since they seem to matter to whether one knows. But many epistemologists now argue that traditionally non-epistemic factors can play a crucial role in whether one knows: on this view, pragmatic or practical considerations should be included among the traditionally ‘epistemic’ factors. If knowledge is stakes-sensitive in some way, then one’s belief that p can fail to be knowledge solely because the practical stakes are too high for one if p is false: being wrong about p will cost you a great deal. If correct, this practical dimension to knowledge makes for a puzzling situation when it comes to religious belief. As Pascal noted, if traditional
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