Evolutionary Game Theory

Evolutionary game theory developed as a means to predict the expected distribution of individual behaviors in a biological system with a single species that evolves under natural selection. It has long since expanded beyond its biological roots and its initial emphasis on models based on symmetric games with a finite set of pure strategies where payoffs result from random one-time interactions between pairs of individuals (i.e. on matrix games). The theory has been extended in many directions (including non-random, multi-player or asymmetric interactions, and games with continuous strategy (or trait) spaces) and has become increasingly important for analyzing human and/or social behavior as well. This chapter initially summarizes features of matrix games before showing how the theory changes when the two-player game has a continuum of traits or interactions become asymmetric. It’s focus is on the connection between static game-theoretic solution concepts (e.g. ESS, CSS, NIS) and stable evolutionary outcomes for deterministic evolutionary game dynamics (e.g. the replicator equation, adaptive dynamics).