Constant-Round Concurrent Non-Malleable Statistically Binding Commitments and Decommitments
نویسندگان
چکیده
When commitment schemes are used in complex environments, e.g., the Internet, the issue of malleability appears, i.e., a concurrent man-in-the-middle adversary might generate commitments to values related to ones committed to by honest players. In the plain model, the current best solution towards resolving this problem in a constant number of rounds is the work of Ostrovsky, Persiano and Visconti (TCC’ 09). They constructed a constant-round commitment scheme that is concurrent non-malleable with respect to both commitment and decommitment. However, the scheme is only computationally binding. For application scenarios where the security of receivers is of a great concern, computational binding may not suffice. In this work, we follow the line of their work and give a construction of statistically binding commitment scheme which is concurrent nonmalleable with respect to both commitment and decommitment. Our work can be seen as a complement of the work of Ostrovsky et al. in the plain model. Our construction relies on the existence of a family of pairs of claw-free permutations and only needs a constant number of communication rounds in the plain model. Our proof of security uses non-black-box techniques and satisfies the (most powerful) simulationbased definitions of non-malleability.
منابع مشابه
Constant-Round Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments and Decommitments
In this paper we consider commitment schemes that are secure against concurrent poly-time man-in-the-middle (cMiM) attacks. Under such attacks, two possible notions of security for commitment schemes have been proposed in the literature: concurrent nonmalleability with respect to commitment and concurrent non-malleability with respect to decommitment (i.e., opening). After the original notion o...
متن کاملSimulation-Based Concurrent Non-malleable Commitments and Decommitments
In this paper we consider commitment schemes that are secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle (cMiM) attacks. Under such attacks, two possible notions of security for commitment schemes have been proposed in the literature: concurrent non-malleability with respect to commitment and concurrent non-malleability with respect to decommitment (i.e., opening). After the original notion of non-mal...
متن کاملAdaptive and Concurrent Secure Computation from New Notions of Non-Malleability
We present a unified framework for obtaining general secure computation that achieves adaptiveUniversally Composable (UC)-security. Our framework captures essentially all previous results on adaptive concurrent secure computation, both in relaxed models (e.g., quasi-polynomial time simulation), as well as trusted setup models (e.g., the CRS model, the imperfect CRS model). This provides concept...
متن کامل4-Round Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments
The round complexity of non-malleable commitments and non-malleable zero knowledge arguments has been an open question for long time. Very recent results of Pass [TCC 2013] and of Goyal et al. [FOCS 2014, STOC 2016], gave almost definitive answers. In this work we show how to construct round-efficient non-malleable protocols via compilers. Starting from protocols enjoying limited non-malleabili...
متن کاملConcurrent Non-Malleable Commitments (and More) in 3 Rounds
The round complexity of commitment schemes secure against man-in-the-middle attacks has been the focus of extensive research for about 25 years. The recent breakthrough of Goyal, Pandey and Richelson [STOC 2016] showed that 3 rounds are sufficient for (one-left, one-right) non-malleable commitments. This result matches a lower bound of [Pas13]. The state of affairs leaves still open the intrigu...
متن کامل