Dirk Bergemann † Alessandro Bonatti
نویسندگان
چکیده
A monopolist sells informative experiments to heterogeneous buyers who face a decision problem. Buyers differ in their prior information, and hence in their willingness to pay for additional signals. The monopolist can profitably offer a menu of experiments. Even under costless acquisition and degrading of information, the optimal menu is quite coarse. The seller offers at most two experiments, and we derive conditions under which flat pricing (one experiment) or discriminatory pricing (two experiments) is optimal.
منابع مشابه
Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline versus Online Media by Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti Cowles Foundation Paper No. 1336 Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics
We develop a model with many advertisers (products) and many advertising markets (media). Each advertiser sells to a different segment of consumers, and each medium is targeting a different audience. We characterize the competitive equilibrium in the advertising markets and evaluate the implications of targeting. An increase in targeting leads to an increase in the total number of consumer-prod...
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