PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE PLEASE DO NOT CITE Altruism, Cooperation and Intrahousehold Allocation: Agricultural Production in Polygynous Households

Cooperative models of household decision-making are proving inadequate in an increasing number of contexts. We argue that altruism among family members can, in fact, inhibit cooperation by increasing the utility that players expect to receive in a non-cooperative equilibrium. To test this, we examine agricultural productivity in polygynous households in West Africa. We find that cooperation is greater – agricultural inputs are allocated more efficiently – among co-wives than among husbands and wives because co-wives share fewer public goods and are less altruistic towards each other. The results cannot be explained by a greater propensity for cooperation among women generally, although they may be due, in part, to the ability of the household head to act as an enforcement mechanism. JEL Codes: D13, J12, O13, O55