TRESOR Runs Encryption Securely Outside RAM
نویسندگان
چکیده
Current disk encryption techniques store necessary keys in RAM and are therefore susceptible to attacks that target volatile memory, such as Firewire and cold boot attacks. We present TRESOR, a Linux kernel patch that implements the AES encryption algorithm and its key management solely on the microprocessor. Instead of using RAM, TRESOR ensures that all encryption states as well as the secret key and any part of it are only stored in processor registers throughout the operational time of the system, thereby substantially increasing its security. Our solution takes advantage of Intel’s new AES-NI instruction set and exploits the x86 debug registers in a non-standard way, namely as cryptographic key storage. TRESOR is compatible with all modern Linux distributions, and its performance is on a par with that of standard AES implementations.
منابع مشابه
A Bytecode Interpreter for Secure Program Execution in Untrusted Main Memory
Physical access to a system allows attackers to read out RAM through cold boot and DMA attacks. Thus far, counter measures protect only against attacks targeting disk encryption keys, while the remaining memory content is left vulnerable. We present a bytecode interpreter that protects code and data of programs against memory attacks by executing them without using RAM for sensitive content. An...
متن کاملFuzzy retrieval of encrypted data by multi-purpose data-structures
The growing amount of information that has arisen from emerging technologies has caused organizations to face challenges in maintaining and managing their information. Expanding hardware, human resources, outsourcing data management, and maintenance an external organization in the form of cloud storage services, are two common approaches to overcome these challenges; The first approach costs of...
متن کاملSub-logarithmic Distributed Oblivious RAM with Small Block Size
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a cryptographic primitive that allows a client to securely execute RAM programs over data that is stored in an untrusted server. Distributed Oblivious RAM is a variant of ORAM, where the data is stored in m non-colluding servers. Extensive research over the last few decades have succeeded to reduce the bandwidth overhead of ORAM schemes, both in the single-server and the...
متن کاملCopker: Computing with Private Keys without RAM
Cryptographic systems are essential for computer and communication security, for instance, RSA is used in PGP Email clients and AES is employed in full disk encryption. In practice, the cryptographic keys are loaded and stored in RAM as plain-text, and therefore vulnerable to physical memory attacks (e.g., cold-boot attacks). To tackle this problem, we propose Copker, which implements asymmetri...
متن کاملAsynchronous Secure Multiparty Computation in Constant Time
In the setting of secure multiparty computation, a set of mutually distrusting parties wish to securely compute a joint function. It is well known that if the communication model is asynchronous, meaning that messages can be arbitrarily delayed by an unbounded (yet finite) amount of time, secure computation is feasible if and only if at least two-thirds of the parties are honest, as was shown b...
متن کامل