on special majority voting and the classical Condorcet jury theorem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The epistemology of special majority voting
It is known that, in Condorcet's classical jury model, the proportion of jurors supporting a decision is not a significant indicator of that decision's reliability: the probability that a particular majority decision is correct given the majority size depends only on the absolute margin between the majority and the minority, and is invariant under changes of the proportion in the majority if th...
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