Behavior in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games with Shifted Outcomes Analyzed with a Statistical Learning Model
نویسندگان
چکیده
The Journal of Mathematical Sociology Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713618269 Behavior in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games with Shifted Outcomes Analyzed with a Statistical Learning Model Marcel Van Assen a; Chris Snijders b; Jeroen Weesie c a Tilburg University, The Netherlands b Eindhoven University, The Netherlands c Utrecht University, The Netherlands
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