Horgan on Sleeping Beauty
نویسنده
چکیده
With the notable exception of David Lewis, most of those writing on the Sleeping Beauty problem have argued that 1/3 is the correct answer. Terence Horgan has provided the clearest account of why, contrary to Lewis, Beauty has evidence against the proposition that the coin comes up heads when she awakens on Monday. In this paper, I argue that Horgan’s proposal fails because it neglects important facts about epistemic probability.
منابع مشابه
Synchronic Bayesian updating and the generalized Sleeping Beauty problem
The two principal answers defended in the literature on the Sleeping Beauty problem (Elga 2000) are 1/2 and 1/3. Roger White (2006) poses a generalized version of the problem. ‘When the main arguments for the answer 1/3 are extended to the generalized case,’ he maintains, ‘they have an unacceptable consequence, whereas extending the halfer’s reasoning turns out rather nicely’ (114). Here I will...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Synthese
دوره 160 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008