Committee Jurisdiction, Congressional Behavior and Policy Outcomes

Although jurisdictional turf wars between congressional committees have long been recognized, scholars have largely overlooked the impact of jurisdictional fights on policy proposals and outcomes. This paper develops a theoretical perspective on how legislators balance the benefits of expanded committee jurisdiction against preferred policy outcomes. It shows why: a) senior members, and young members in safe districts are most likely to challenge a committee’s jurisdiction; b) policy proposals may be initiated off the proposer’s ideal point in order to obtain jurisdiction; c) policy outcomes will generally be more moderate with jurisdictional fights than without these turf wars. We empirically investigate these results with an examination of proposed Internet intellectual property protection legislation in the 106 Congress. Thanks to seminar participants at MIT, Stanford, and Berkeley for helpful comments and discussions. I would also like to thank the many people at companies, universities, and associations who permitted to be interviewed for this paper. Daniel Braga provided excellent research assistance.